Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of by P. Dicken

By P. Dicken

Confident empiricism is not only a view in regards to the objective of technological know-how; it's also a view concerning the epistemological framework during which one should still debate the purpose of technology. this can be the focal point of this ebook – no longer with clinical fact, yet with how one may still argue approximately medical fact.

Show description

Read or Download Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science PDF

Similar epistemology books

The Rejection of Continental Drift: Theory and Method in American Earth Science

Within the early 20th century, American earth scientists have been united of their competition to the new--and hugely radical--notion of continental glide, even going as far as to label the speculation "unscientific. " a few fifty years later, despite the fact that, continental float used to be heralded as a huge medical leap forward and at the present time it really is accredited as clinical truth.

Perception and Reason

Invoice Brewer provides an unique view of the function of awake adventure within the acquisition of empirical wisdom. He argues that perceptual stories needs to offer purposes for empirical ideals if there are to be any determinate ideals in any respect approximately specific items on this planet. This clean method of epistemology turns clear of the hunt for useful and enough stipulations for wisdom and works in its place from a concept of realizing in a specific region.

The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception

The character of notion has lengthy been a vital query in philosophy. it really is of valuable value not only for the philosophy of brain, but in addition for epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of technological know-how. This quantity represents the easiest of the most recent learn on notion, with contributions from a number of the prime philosophers within the quarter, together with Christopher Peacocke, Brian O'Shaughnessy and Michael Tye.

Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? (Epistemische Studien)

This booklet is targeted on an issue that has aroused the main controversy in contemporary epistemological debate, that is no matter if the reality can or can't be the basic epistemic aim. conventional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of fact with out giving a deeper research. To epistemic worth pluralists, the declare that fact is the basic worth turns out unjustified.

Extra info for Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science

Sample text

More to the point, it is also clear that constructive empiricism – as it has been articulated and defended by van Fraassen – cannot make any epistemological claims regarding the nature of science. This follows from the broader epistemological project within which it is to be situated. According to van Fraassen’s so-called voluntarist epistemology, rationality is to be considered as a matter of permission rather than obligation, where one is rationally entitled to believe anything that one is not rationally compelled to disbelieve.

And so it is with the traditional and voluntarist conceptions of rationality. For the scientific realist, there are certain beliefs that one is allowed to hold (relative to a particular set of data), and there are certain inferences that one is allowed to make; and anything else (such as the constructive empiricist’s doxastic dilettantism) is therefore deemed irrational. For the constructive empiricist, there are certain beliefs that one is forbidden to hold (relative to a particular set of data), and there are certain inferences that one is forbidden to make; and anything else (counterfactual inequality, refusing to infer the truth of one’s best explanations) is all that one could hope to mean by ‘rational’.

My subjective probability for coming to believe the theory of evolution even though the theory of evolution is false should therefore be: Pt (E) × Pt (¬H) = 0. 4 × 0. 6 = 0. 2 as stated above. In short, the distribution of subjective probabilities in the diachronic Dutch-book argument is inconsistent with the Reflection Principle; and any agent who respects the Reflection Principle will therefore be immune from the sort of incoherence these arguments generate. The final steps of the argument then proceed rather swiftly.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.50 of 5 – based on 9 votes